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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON ISSUES OF HEALTH AND
SAFETY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: THE EXPERIENCE UNDER
NEW YORK'S TAYLOR LAW
ARTHUR S. LEONARD*

The New York Public Employees' Fair Employment Act,1
commonly known as the "Taylor Law," imposes upon public em-

ployers in New York State a duty to negotiate with labor organizations representing their employees with respect to "terms and conditions of employment." 2 Working conditions affecting employee

health and safety are frequently the subject of bargaining demands
by public sector unions in New York, and the Public Employment

Relations Board (PERB), the agency charged with administration
of the Taylor Law,s has often grappled with the question whether a

particular health and safety demand comes within the scope of the
statutory negotiating duty.
Demands related to health and safety issues require PERB to

confront a fundamental dilemma inherent in public sector collective bargaining: to what extent should a public employer's basic
policy decisions with respect to the manner and means of providing public services (which decisions are not subject to collective

bargaining) be subject indirectly to the negotiation process, given
the Taylor Law's policy of allowing public employees to negotiate
* Assistant Professor of Law, New York iLaw School. Cornell University, B.S., 1974;
Harvard University, J.D., 1977. This Article was written while the author was associated in
law practice with the New York office of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson.
1. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973) [hereinafter cited as Taylor Law].
The Taylor Law was enacted in 1967 as a substitute for the restrictive Condon-Wadlin Act
of 1947. The Taylor Law is modeled in many respects on the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976), as amended. For a brief history of public sector
labor law in New York State, see W. NEWHOUSE, PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATxONS LAW IN
NEW YORK STATE § 1.02 (1978).
2. Taylor Law, § 204(2).
3. The Public Employment Relations Board [hereinafter cited as PERB], established in
§ 205 of the Taylor Law, is the administrative agency analogous to the National Labor Relations Board in the private sector. Its functions include certification of bargaining representatives, imposition of strike penalties on labor organizations, adjudication of unfair employment practice charges, and conduct of the multi-faceted dispute resolution mechanisms
provided in the statute.
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about their "terms and conditions" of employment? 4 It is the thesis of this Article that PERB has not found a fully satisfactory
resolution to this problem in the health and safety area. Indeed,
while appearing to restrict the scope of negotiations by holding
that particular demands relating directly to the manner and means
of providing service to the public are not directly subject to the
bargaining requirement, PERB has allowed the labor organizations
to develop many "back door" approaches to negotiating about the
very subjects which had seemed to be ruled not negotiable. In so
doing, PERB has set the stage for potential confrontations of great
public impact as new laws dealing with public sector health and
safety take effect and begin to be enforced by other state agencies.6
I. THE

NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK: MANDATORY V. PERMISSIVE

SUBJECTS

Under the Taylor Law, the scope of mandatory negotiations is
defined by the phrase "terms and conditions of employment."'7 In
an early opinion discussing this phrase, City School District of the
City of New Rochelle,8 PERB described the subjects of bargaining
to consist generally of "salaries, wages, hours and other conditions
4. In Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 282 N.E.2d 109, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1972), the court of appeals
held that any subject (e.g., length of work year) which constituted a "term or condition of
employment" was subject to mandatory negotiation. 30 N.Y.2d at 127, 282 N.E.2d at 112,
331 N.Y.S.2d at 21. However, in West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46,
315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974), the court noted that subjects affecting basic questions of how a public service is provided (e.g., school class size) were negotiable only with
respect to their impact on terms and conditions of employment. 35 N.Y.2d at 50-52, 315
N.E.2d at 777-78, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 722-24. For a summary of rulings in several states with
respect to scope of public sector negotiations, see Annot., 84 A.L.R.3d 242-313 (1978).
5. These "back door" approaches, discussed infra, include "impact" bargaining, hazardous duty pay, and grievance arbitration with respect to health and safety issues.
6. Particularly noteworthy in this regard are the New York Toxic Substances Law, N.Y.
Pun. HEALTH LAW §§ 4800-08 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82), N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 875-83 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82), and the New York State Occupational Safety & Health Law, N.Y. LAB.
LAW § 27-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) [hereinafter cited as SOSHA]. Enforcement responsibility for the Toxic Substances Law is vested in the Health Commissioner, N.Y. Pun.
HEALTH LAW § 4802, the Industrial Commissioner, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 876 and 880, and the
Attorney General, id. at § 882. SOSHA is enforced by the Industrial Commissioner and the
Attorney General. SOSHA § 27-a.
7. Taylor Law § 204. "Public employers are hereby empowered to recognize employee
organizations for the purpose of negotiating collectively in the determination of... [the]
terms and conditions of employment of their public employees .... " Id.
8. 4 P.E.R.B. 1 3060 (1971).
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of employment."' PERB noted the similarity of its statutory bargaining definition with that contained in the National Labor Rela-

tions Act,10 but observed that, as expressly required by the Taylor
Law, PERB had to recognize "fundamental distinctions between

private and public employment," and to refrain from giving "binding or controlling" precedential value to state or federal private
sector law with respect to the scope of mandatory bargaining.""
In the New Rochelle case, PERB embraced the three-part
scheme with respect to classification of bargaining proposals (i.e.,
mandatory, permissive, illegal) which has been developed by the
12
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal courts,

but stated that the peculiar status of public employers as governmental bodies introduced special considerations with respect to de-

termining whether a bargaining proposal fell within the mandatory
category:
A public employer exists to provide certain services to its constituents,
be it police protection, sanitation or, as in the case of the employer herein,
education. Of necessity, the public employer, acting through its executive or

legislative body, must determine the manner and means by which such services are to be rendered and the extent thereof, subject to the approval or
disapproval of the public so served, as manifested in the electoral process

[sic] Decisions of a public employer with respect to the carrying out of its
9. Id. at 3705.
10. "[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the [union] to ... confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment .

. . ."

29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). When construing

this provision, the National Labor Relations Board has frequently recognized employee
health and safety to be a mandatory subject for collective bargaining. Carbonex Coal Co.,
248 N.L.R.B. 779 (1980); J.P. Stevens & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 738 (1978), modified on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981); Electri-Flex Co.,
238 N.L.R.B. 713 (1978), enforced, 104 L.R.R.M. 2612 (7th Cir. 1979); Gulf Power Co., 156
N.L.R.B. 622, enforced, 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967).
11. 4 P.E.R.B. at 3706; Taylor Law § 209-a(3). One such fundamental difference is that
New York public sector unions and their members may be subjected to harsh financial penalties and loss of status if they strike in support of their negotiating demands. Id. at §§ 21011. Furthermore, police and fire department employees are provided with a mandatory arbitration procedure to resolve their disputes over new contract terms, id. at § 209(4), as are
employees of the City of New York. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 54, §§ 1173.10-13.0 (1967).
12. The federal scheme for classification of bargaining topics in the private sector provides that employers must bargain with respect to mandatory subjects, may bargain with
respect to permissive subjects, and may not be requested to bargain with respect to illegal
subjects. The bargaining duty arises once a labor organization has been certified or formally
recognized by the employer and requests bargaining. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203 (1964); N.L.R.B. v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342
(1958); N.L.R.B. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
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mission, such as a decision to eliminate or curtail a service, are matters that
a public employer should not be compelled to negotiate with its employees.
Here there must be noted a substantial difference between private employers
and public employers, for the latter "owe a very special obligation to the public not owed by private employers. . . ." This is not to say, however, that an
employee organization is precluded from seeking negotiations concerning
such decisions on a permissive basis.

Thus, PERB took the position that public employee unions could
not require negotiations with respect to basic policy decisions of
public employers
having to do with the "carrying out" of their
' 14
"missions.

Despite this superficially clear-cut pronouncement,

however, the process of line drawing by PERB between
"mandatory" and "permissive" negotiating subjects has not been
easy or consistent, because many, if not most, subjects have numerous implications for the manner or means of providing the
public service which is the "mission" of the public employer.
PERB holds that a public employer may not be compelled to
negotiate about the substance of its public mission, the methods it
selects to fulfill that mission, or similar issues which may affect
terms and conditions of employment. 15 However, the employer can
be compelled to negotiate about the impact of such decisions on
employment terms and conditions. 16 A primary example of this
policy is the issue of class size in educational institutions. A school
board or administration may not be compelled to negotiate about
class size, per se, which is a question of educational policy. 17 How-

ever, in Yorktown Faculty Association,18 PERB held that a union

13. 4 P.E.R.B. at 3706-07 (emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted).
14. This position was confirmed by the court of appeals in West Irondequoit Teachers
Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974).
15. New Rochelle, 4 P.E.R.B. 3060, at 3706; see West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 4
P.E.R.B. 3070 at 3727 (1971), affd, 42 A.D.2d 808, 346 N.Y.S.2d 418 (3d Dep't 1973), afl'd,
35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974).
16. As PERB stated in West Irondequoit:
Nevertheless, impact is a matter for negotiations. Thus, it is not the thrust of
this decision that an employer is not required to negotiate on subjects which
affect the allocation of resources because salaries clearly have such an effect;
rather, the thrust of this decision ... is that basic policy decisions as to the
implementation of a mission of an agency of government are not mandatory subjects of negotiations.
4 P.E.R.B. at 3727. This statement was quoted with approval by the court in West Irondequoit, 35 N.Y.2d at 51, 315 N.E.2d at 778, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
17. West Irondequoit Bd. of Educ., 35 N.Y.2d at 49, 315 N.E.2d at 776, 358 N.Y.S.2d at
721.
18. 7 P.E.R.B. 3030 (1974).
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may demand negotiations on the subject of teacher workloads,
which are computed by taking into account many factors, including class size, number of classes, length of classes, and ancillary
student contact duties. The figure resulting from such calculations,
known as "weighted student contact minutes" (WSCM), can be the
subject of negotiations, because, among other things, it has a direct
bearing on wages (i.e., how much pay for how much work). Once a
particular WSCM has been negotiated, a school employer may
have to reduce class size or the number of classes assigned to individual teachers in order to comply with the contractual limitations
on teacher workload, because the number of students assigned to a
class is one of the variables in the calculation of the WSCM.1
Similar logic runs through PERB's other decisions on whether
particular health- and safety-related demands constitute
mandatory negotiation subjects. PERB's stated preference is for
parties to establish joint procedures and mechanisms, such as a
joint safety committee, which can then consider safety issues on a
case-by-case basis in light of the individual facts of each case, or to
adopt a general safety clause in their collective agreements, leaving
to their grievance arbitration mechanism the resolution of disputes
about violations of the clause. One general safety clause approved
as a mandatory subject by PERB reads as follows: "The Employer
agrees to endeavor to provide safety standards for the protection of
employees' well-being commensurate with those presently in effect
in the private sector and to provide and maintain safe and healthful working conditions and to initiate and maintain operating practices that will safeguard employees."20
As to the creation of a joint committee, PERB states:
Safety as a general subject is a mandatory subject of negotiations. To attempt
to provide in an agreement all aspects of safety would be an exercise in futility in that one could not anticipate in specific language all possible eventualities .... We submit that no labor contract can be drafted to provide for all
eventualities.
We suggest that the parties through the negotiating process could create
a joint safety policy committee that operates under general guidelines that
are recited in the contract to consider issues of safety . ..

.This process

could be made subject to the grievance arbitration procedure. A demand to
19. Yorktown Faculty Ass'n, 7 P.E.R.B. 113030 (1974); West Irondequoit Bd.of Educ., 4
P.E.R.B. 1 3070 (1972), affd, 42 A.D.2d 808, 346 N.Y.S.2d 418 (3d Dep't 1973), afd, 35
N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1974).
20. CSEA, Niagara Chapter, 14 P.E.R.B. T 3049, at 3081 (1981).
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establish such a joint safety policy committee would be a mandatory subject
of negotiations.21

The creation of such mechanisms to resolve safety disputes
may appear to be a reasonable "easy way out" of the dilemma
faced by PERB. On the one hand, PERB is not requiring the employer to negotiate directly about substantive issues which relate
both to public service policies and safety, such as the number of
firemen assigned to a hook-and-ladder device, or the type of firearms to be issued to police officers on night foot-patrol. On the
other hand, PERB is requiring the employer to negotiate about
creation of a mechanism which may well compel the employer to
alter just such policies at the behest of the union. In the examples
cited above, the unions might file grievances claiming that the employer's policy decisions with respect to the number of firemen assigned or the type of firearms issued violate the contract's general
safety clause. If an arbitrator were to be persuaded that the
union's position was correct, the arbitrator could order the employer to change its policy.2 2 The policy decision is thus taken out
of the employer's hands indirectly through arbitration. The parties
could negotiate a restrictive arbitration provision depriving the arbitrator of authority to consider safety questions which affect the
manner and means of providing public services, but such a restrictive arbitration clause would obviously vitiate the usefulness of the
"joint mechanism" approach urged by PERB.
21. White Plains P.B.A., 9 P.E.R.B. 1 3007, at 3010-11 (1976).
22. Although the arbitrator's decision would be subject to judicial review, it would not
necessarily be set aside merely because a public policy question was involved. Former Chief
Judge Breitel has commented that an arbitrator's award must amount to "gross illegality"
to justify a court setting it aside. Port Washington Union Free School Dist. v. Port Washington Teachers Ass'n, 45 N.Y.2d 411, 422, 380 N.E.2d 280, 286, 408 N.Y.S.2d 453, 459
(1978); accord, Port Jefferson Station Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Brookhaven-Comsewogue
Union Free School Dist., 45 N.Y.2d 898, 383 N.E.2d 553, 411 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1978). Indeed, the
court of appeals has held that, when a policy question is not implicated, an arbitrator's
award is to be enforced even if it rests on an incorrect application of law, so long as it is not
"completely irrational." Rochester City School Dist. v. Rochester Teachers Ass'n, 41 N.Y.2d
578, 362 N.E.2d 977, 394 N.Y.S.2d 179 (1977). The court has refused to enforce an award
granting a teacher tenure, Legislative Conference of CUNY v. Board of Higher Educ., 31
N.Y.2d 926, 293 N.E.2d 92, 340 N.Y.S.2d 924, modifying and affirming, 38 A.D.2d 478, 330
N.Y.S.2d 688 (1st Dep't 1972), or an award ordering appointment of a grievant to a new job
which had not been established pursuant to required civil service procedures, CSEA, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 48 N.Y.2d 66, 397 N.E.2d 350, 421 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1979). In both instances, there was a particular provision of state law which would render enforcement of the
arbitrator's award patently unlawful.
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II. PERB RULINGS ON PARTICULAR NEGOTIATION DEMANDS
A.

Staffing

Perhaps the most frequently recurring negotiation demands
related to health and safety, and the most difficult with which
PERB has had to deal, are demands related to staffing in the areas
of police and firefighters. 5 They are frequently couched in terms
of health and safety, especially where they relate to crew size on a
specific piece of equipment or number of employees to be deployed
in a specific situation.2 '
PERB initially dealt with the staffing issue by ruling that total
staffing (the number of employees in a police force or in a fire department) was not a mandatory subject, but that crew size "per
piece of equipment" was negotiable "as to safety aspects." 2 5 However, in January, 1976, in White Plains P.B.A.,28 PERB reconsidered its previously-stated position and decided to abandon it:
We now reconsider our conclusions in the earlier White Plains and Albany Police Officers cases. In doing so we find the safety aspects of duties
assigned to police or firefighters no less compelling. We support the concept
that such dangers or perils should be minimized. However, we do not believe
that each negotiating demand should be scrutinized through the vehicle of a
hearing as to safety considerations. This would cripple the negotiating process and our expedited procedure for resolving scope issues. We submit that
these safety considerations, as important as they are, can be dealt with in a
manner more compatible to the negotiating process and in a manner that can
23. Because mandatory subjects of negotiation in the police and fire areas are subject to
compulsory interest arbitration in the event of a bargaining impasse, PERB's decisions in
those areas are of particular importance with respect to the policy dilemma previously described. If a bargaining demand is not a mandatory subject, the employer may refuse to
negotiate about it, and it may not be presented to the "interest arbitration" panel for consideration. "Interest arbitration" is a term used to describe binding arbitration over new
contract terms, as differentiated from "rights" or "grievance" arbitration, which deals with
the settlement of disputes between the contracting parties over their existing contractual
rights.
24. It was settled early in the history of the National Labor Relations Act that "number
of employees" or "crew size" are mandatory subjects of bargaining in the private sector.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500 (1946), enf. denied on othergrounds, 161 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1947).
25. The New Rochelle decision, 4 P.E.R.B. 3060 (1971), established the general principle that staffing per se was not a mandatory subject. In City of White Plains, 5 P.E.R.B. 1
3008 (1972) and City of Albany, 7 P.E.R.B. 13078 (1974), PERB carved out a specific exception for staffing with respect to particular equipment or assignments where the union could
establish a significant safety factor in its negotiation demand.
26. 9 P.E.R.B. 1 3007 (1976).
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27
deal with safety considerations more realistically and more efficaciously.

PERB held that the P.B.A.'s demand for two employees in all patrol cars was not a mandatory negotiation issue, and recommended
to the parties that they negotiate instead about forming a joint
safety committee, which could then decide whether two employees
should be assigned in particular circumstances without setting a
general minimum staffing requirement.28

A similar demand arose in I.A.F.F. of Newburgh, Local 589,29

where firefighters demanded a minimum crew size for each "rig."
Once again, PERB had to decide whether the demand was essentially a safety demand, or rather primarily a demand with respect
to manpower and deployment policy. PERB's conclusion, consistent with its decision in White Plains P.B.A.,30 was that this was
primarily a staffing demand rather than a safety demand:
While the record in the investigatory hearing indicated that rig manning
may have certain aspects of safety, it does not establish that the subject is
predominantly one of safety. .

.

. [T]he predominant characteristic of the

rig manning demand is that of manpower and the deployment of firefighters.
Thus, the demand is essentially one of management prerogative as to how
best to service public safety needs and is not a mandatory subject of negotiation. Accordingly, while we conclude that a demand in general terms for
firefighters' safety is a mandatory subject of negotiation, we determine that
the specific demand for a "minimum number of men that must be on duty at
all times per piece of fire fighting equipment" is not. . . . [W]e are not dealing with a subject directly affecting only the employer and employee relationship, but rather we are dealing with a basic element of governmental policy
bearing upon the extent and quality of service to the public.3 '

As noted previously, however, PERB's recommendation to the
parties in these cases (to leave such issues to grievance arbitration)
undercuts the rationale PERB employs in deciding that the negotiating demands are not mandatory subjects. Thus, if the decision
27. Id. at 3010.
28. Id. at 3010-11.
29. 10 P.E.R.B. 1 3001, afl'd, 59 A.D.2d 342, 399 N.Y.S.2d 334 (3d Dep't 1977).
30. 9 P.E.R.B. 1 3007 (1976).
31. I.A.F.F. of Newburg, 10 P.E.R.B. at 3003 (citation omitted, emphasis supplied in
part). In City of New Rochelle v. Crowley, 61 A.D.2d 1031, 403 N.Y.S.2d 100 (2d Dep't
1978), the court approved a similar PERB ruling with respect to a staffing demand, noting
that PERB had "established an eminently reasonable balance between the conflicting considerations involved" (61 A.D.2d at 1032, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 102) by urging the parties to
negotiate about creating a health and safety committee to resolve such problems on a caseby-case basis.
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whether to deploy two police employees on foot or auto patrol is a
managerial policy question when proposed by the union as a contractual requirement, why is it any less a policy question when the
union files a grievance alleging that a one-officer patrol car violates
the general safety clause in the contract? Why should a public employer be forced to delegate its policy determination of a particular

assignment to a grievance arbitrator, when it is not required to
subject the broader policy decision of adopting a general rule to an
impasse arbitration panel, or to negotiate about the subject to an
impasse?3 2 PERB appears to be saying that general policy ques-

tions are not mandatory subjects, but specific policy questions are.
The rationale advanced by PERB has little to do with the
question of who should make those policy decisions. It has, rather,

to do with the question of the context in which the decision will be
made. Apparently, a general policy decision should not, in PERB's

opinion, be made in the context of negotiations, but rather should
be made in the context of an arbitration hearing where it will be
resolved in a particular case based on particular facts."3
This may involve a judgment by PERB, not quite clearly articulated in its decisions, that policy questions involving the man32. Or, viewed from the union's perspective, why should the union be precluded from
arguing in negotiations that all foot patrols should be manned by at least two officers, if the
union has the safety data to support its demand? Why must the union have to fight that
battle in an individual arbitration over every assignment?
33. Query, in this regard, whether the enforcers of SOSHA, the new New York public
sector health and safety law, will defer to arbitration decisions involving health and safety
issues decided under a "general duty" style contract provision. The Federal Occupational
Safety and Health Administration [hereinafter cited as OSHA] has adopted a regulation
providing for such deferral on a basis similar to that embraced by the NLRB, but only in
cases involving employee allegations of discrimination based on protected health and safety
activities. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18 (1981). Under this regulation, the agency will postpone
processing an employee complaint where the employee is simultaneously pursuing substantially the same complaint under a contractual grievance procedure. The arbitrator's award
will merit deferral if OSHA determines that there was an adequate determination of the
factual issues, the proceedings were procedurally fair, and the result was not "repugnant to
the purpose and policy of the Act." 29 C.F.R. § 1977.18(c) (1981). See, e.g., Brennan v. Alan
Wood Steel Co., 3 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1654 (E.D. Pa. 1975). However, this regulation is
probably not considered a "safety and health standard" of the type intended in section 27a(4) of SOSHA, see supra note 6. See, e.g., Louisiana Chemical Ass'n v. Bingham, 657 F.2d
777 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussion of "standards" as distinguished from "regulations"). The
regulation thus will not necessarily be adopted by the Industrial Commissioner as a SOSHA
regulation. (Indeed, it was not so adopted when the Commissioner made his first attempt to
adopt federal regulations under SOSHA. See infra note 84.) Furthermore, there is no statutory or regulatory deferral mechanism under OSHA with respect to arbitration over issues
other than employee discrimination.
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ner and means of providing public services may be based on an
objective consideration of the merits by an impartial neutral (the
arbitrator), but may not be based on the relative negotiating
strengths of the parties. However, this is not really a judgment
that a subject is or is not mandatory; it is, rather, a judgment as to
how the mandatory subject is to be dealt with, inasmuch as grievance arbitration is really just a different part of the collective negotiation process.3
Thus, it appears that the initial distinction drawn by PERB
prior to the 1976 White Plains P.B.A. case may have been more
nearly correct than PERB's more recent doctrine with respect to
staffing. The relationship of overall staffing of an agency or a department to safety considerations may be very real, but it is somewhat attenuated. However, a staffing demand with respect to a
particular piece of equipment or a particular potentially dangerous
work assignment so clearly relates to the terms and conditions of
employment of the employees that to hold it non-mandatory (yet
potentially subject to arbitration) appears to be a serious misapplication of the entire concept of mandatory subjects of bargaining.
B. Hazardous Duty Pay
Police and firefighter unions have frequently demanded some
form of "hazardous duty pay," couched as a health and safety issue. These proposals normally specify particular "hazardous" conditions or circumstances under which premium pay is to be given
to the employee. PERB has upheld the right of public sector unions to negotiate for such pay on the theory that it is merely an
element of wages, as against the arguments of employers that such
pay is really a penalty designed to coerce management in the exercise of its exclusive prerogatives. In a recent case, Village of Spring
Valley P.B.A.,35 PERB commented:
The proposition of law advanced by the Village is that a demand is improper
34. PERB has recognized this very problem, albeit in puzzling and inconsistent ways, in
its decisions with respect to the status of negotiation demands for clauses dealing with arbitration or other joint determinations of safety-related issues. In some of those cases, see
infra notes 42-50 & accompanying text, PERB has stated that such a demand is not a
mandatory subject if it could be interpreted to require submission to arbitration of nonmandatory subjects. In other cases, however, PERB has let pass some proposals which could
require submission of "non-mandatory" topics to arbitration.
35. Village of Spring Valley P.B.A., 14 P.E.R.B. 1 3010 (1981).
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if it sets up a system of penalties primarily designed to prohibit the public

employer from exercising its statutory responsibilities even if, on its face, the
demand is for premium pay.

This proposition of law is correct, but there is no evidence in the record
that makes it applicable here. All premium pay provisions impose some costs

upon an employer and thus discourage some conduct. It does not follow, however, that these provisions constitute penalties. For a premium pay provision

to be deemed a penalty, it must be shown that the provision bears no reasonable relationship to a particular hazard or to other circumstances affecting
working conditions which it is designed to compensate. There is no such
showing in the record before us.3 6

Thus, so long as the premium pay demand has some "reasonable
relationship" to a hazardous working condition, PERB will find the
demand to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. In the Spring
Valley case, the police union demanded a pay premium of $90 a
shift to be divided among all officers on the shift if the total number assigned to the shift fell below six. The union also demanded
an extra $5 per shift for any Officer not provided with a working
portable radio on patrol, or who was assigned to use a patrol car
not equipped with power windows. PERB held all these demands
to be mandatory subjects of bargaining, even though the underlying demands (i.e., selection of equipment) would clearly not have
been considered mandatory by PERB.
In Haverstraw P.B.A.,37 the police union produced an interesting and wide-ranging set of hazardous duty pay demands, all upheld by PERB as mandatory subjects, including extra pay under
the following circumstances:
1) where the town failed to provide firearms training in the
amount of at least 100 rounds per month;
2) where more than three years passed between high speed
driver training sessions;
3) for assignments of patrol without the use of blackjacks;
4) for every day of patrol while the department forbids the use
of 0.327 calibre ammunition;
5) for operating a patrol car without snow tires; and
6) for assignments of patrol when nightsticks or mace are
prohibited.
Each of these demands relates to a substantive demand that would
36. Id. at 3017 (footnote omitted).
37. 11 P.E.R.B. 1 3109 (1978), aft'd, Town of Haverstraw v. Newman, 75 A.D.2d 874,
427 N.Y.S.2d 880 (2d Dep't 1980).
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most likely be held by PERB to be a non-mandatory subject, judging by PERB's rulings on similar substantive demands. 8 In each
case, the union, by structuring its demand in terms of premium
pay, has managed to circumvent PERB's policy against requiring
bargaining with respect to the underlying "policy" issue.
In Firefighters Union Local 189 (City of Newburgh),"9 PERB
dealt with a hazardous duty pay demand from firefighters phrased
entirely in terms of staffing, providing for a pay premium whenever
staffing fell below certain levels. PERB held that this sort of demand was analogous to a workload limitation demand by a teachers' union. While a teachers' union may not compel negotiations on
the subject of class size, it can demand to negotiate on workload,
which is a consequence of, inter alia, class size. Similarly, while a
firefighters union cannot compel direct negotiations on staffing, it
can demand negotiation for premium pay linked to staffing levels,
because workload is a function of staffing.
Under the PERB decisions, hazardous duty pay is a mechanism which public sector unions can use to compel bargaining indirectly about the very subjects that PERB has said are not
mandatory subjects for negotiation. As such, it is clear that the
PERB decisions casting such subjects into the purgatory of the
non-mandatory sphere are of little real effect.
Premium pay in a time of fiscal restraint may not be a plausible alternative for a public sector employer. In cases where the premium pay relates to policy questions which are not primarily economic in character, such as the carrying of blackjacks by police
officers, the employer may have no alternative but to adopt the
policy decision underlying the union's request. Hazardous duty pay
thus creates a legal loophole through which the public sector unions in the "risky" professions can lead their troops into the heart
of what PERB has deemed to be the managerial prerogatives of
public employers. This raises a question whether PERB has correctly classified policy decisions of somewhat lesser significance as
non-mandatory, a question illuminated by New York Court of Appeals decisions on enforceability of arbitral awards.4 0 Rather than
forcing the public sector unions to resort to the subterfuge of "haz38.

See infra text accompanying note 64.

39.

11 P.E.R.B. 1 3087 (1978).

40.

See supra note 22.
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ardous duty pay," might not PERB better evaluate the significance
of the policy prerogatives it purportedly seeks to preserve when it
classifies such relatively minor questions as providing grill lights on
police cars as non-mandatory? 1
C. Safety Committees
As noted above, PERB and the courts have frequently recommended that joint safety committees be established to deal with
safety disputes. Public employers have continued to challenge the
mandatory nature of such demands, however, on the basis that the
proposed provision would give the safety committee too broad a
jurisdiction. In Fairview Firefighters Local 1586,42 PERB held
non-mandatory (and thus not subject to compulsory "interest arbitration") a demand for the establishment of a joint safety committee which would "cover all matters relating to the health and
safety of the bargaining unit as prescribed and set forth by this
Public Arbitration Panel.''43 In PERB's view, this demand was
non-mandatory because it did not specify the lawful jurisdiction of
such a joint committee, and such a subject could not be left to the
Arbitration Panel to determine as part of the compulsory "interest
arbitration" process because the Panel might produce an arbitration clause with too wide a scope.
Surprisingly, however, PERB has found proposals for joint
safety committees which included a more detailed description of
their jurisdiction, potentially covering non-mandatory subjects, to
be mandatory. Thus, in Firefighters Union Local 189 (City of
Newburgh)," PERB approved the following proposal as a
mandatory bargaining subject:
The Committee's jurisdiction shall cover all matters of safety and health to
the members of the Fire Department, including but not limited to, the total
number of employees reporting to a fire and the minimum number of employees to be assigned to each piece of firefighting apparatus. The foregoing is
intended to be illustrative and not all inclusive .... In the event of a dead-

lock between Firefighters and City representatives, the issue in dispute shall
be submitted to binding arbitration. .... 45
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See, e.g., Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, 10 P.E.R.B. 1 3042 (1977).
12 P.E.R.B. 1 3083 (1979).
Id. at 3158 (emphasis supplied to the statement of the union's demand by PERB).
11 P.E.R.B. 1 3087 (1978).
Id. at 3144. Interestingly, PERB had no comment on the phrase "members of the
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Clearly, this proposal contemplates subjecting inherently managerial decisions (as found by PERB in its staffing cases) to binding arbitration. PERB has held that staffing per se is a nonmandatory subject; how can PERB reconcile its finding that no
duty to bargain over staffing exists, with its recognition of a duty
to bargain over a proposal that staffing be made subject to compulsory grievance arbitration? PERB's explanation of its decision in
the Newburgh case is no explanation at all:
The City argues that the language of the demand here istoo broad and might
permit the safety committee to set general minimum manning requirements
under the guise of a purported safety claim. Although we agree that the language of the demand might be improved upon, we do not find it defective....[I]n its brief to us here, [the firefighters' union] argues that its demand is not intended to set general manning standards. Nevertheless, if the
demand is ultimately accepted or imposed, the parties, through negotiations,
or the arbitrator appointed pursuant to § 209.4 of the Taylor Law, would do
46
well to clarify the language with this concern in mind.

Why should the impasse panel be trusted to limit the scope of jurisdiction of the joint committee in Newburgh but not trusted to
do the same in Fairview? In short, PERB seems to be implying
that a non-mandatory subject can in effect be made mandatory by
embodying it in an otherwise mandatory grievance resolution procedure. Even if the interest arbitrator takes into account the nonmandatory nature of the underlying demand, this decision vitiates
the whole concept of inherently managerial concerns being nonbargainable. Indeed, it is hard to see any real distinction in this
regard between the proposal in this case and the one disapproved
by PERB in Fairview. In both instances, the proposal could leave
significant questions concerning jurisdiction of the safety committee to be resolved by an interest arbitrator. Yet PERB approves
doing so where the provision tells the arbitrator to include nonmandatory subjects in his jurisdiction, but disapproves doing so
where there is no such instruction to the arbitrator. Surely this is a
basic inconsistency in PERB's position.
Fire Department." In a recent decision, Oneida P.B.A., 15 P.E.R.B. 1 4530 (1982), a PERB
Hearing Officer held non-mandatory a similar safety committee proposal because it purported to cover "members of the police department" without excluding non-bargaining unit
police employees. Id: at 4568. PERB has held that unions may not make demands.with
respect to employment conditions of non-unit employees. Somers Faculty Ass'n, 9 P.E.R.B.
1 3014 (1976). "
46. 11 P.E.R.B. 1 3087, at 3144 (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted).
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In some cases, unions have proposed that the public employer
recognize a union safety committee as having some particular
standing or authority, even though it does not include employer
representatives. PERB has rejected as non-mandatory several different variations of this approach, on the grounds that it really
constitutes a demand that the employer delegate policymaking decisions to the union.
For example, in Troy Uniformed FirefightersLocal 2304,48 the
union proposed that its own safety committee be entitled to order
removed from service equipment which it judged to be unsafe.
PERB rejected this proposal out-of-hand, stating that it would entirely remove a managerial prerogative from the control of the employer. In City of Kingston,9 the union proposed that its own
safety committee be authorized to "certify" to the Fire Chief that
particular equipment was unsafe. PERB rejected this proposal as
well, contending that the proposal did not make clear what the effect of certification was to be. Implicit in the proposal was the assumption that once it was certified as unsafe by the union, a piece
of equipment would not be used by the employees. As in the Troy
Firefighterscase, PERB would not require an employer to bargain
over a proposal to remove from the employer's control decisions
about what equipment to use. Of course, under a general safety
clause, a union could file a grievance over the safety of particular
equipment; in that instance, a neutral arbitrator would decide
whether the equipment was unsafe, not a one-sided union
committee.
Under existing PERB decisions, the issue of scope of jurisdiction of joint safety committees is poorly defined. PERB has stated
that an employer may be required to negotiate only about
mandatory subjects, but this would appear to exclude the sorts of
staffing questions (like number of officers on a police assignment)
which PERB has apparently approved leaving to the committee
process for resolution. This is clearly an area where a "definitive
47. The NLRB has apparently taken a contrary position with respect to the private
sector. See, e.g., Carbonex Coal Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 779 (1980) (union may demand negotiation over proposal to create employee-operated safety committee authorized to order unilateral shutdown of mine on safety grounds).
48. 10 P.E.R.B. 1 3015 (1977).
49. 9 P.E.R.B. 3069 (1976).
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Non-Mandatory Health or Safety Related Subjects

PERB has held to be non-mandatory many types of demands
which have a conceptual relationship to the area of employee
health and safety. Most of these non-mandatory subjects were demands for particular types of safety equipment. PERB's rationale
has been that the selection and deployment of equipment to be
used is a management prerogative.5 1 However, as noted above in
connection with hazardous duty pay, a union may compel negotiation about premium pay in the event that the employer fails to use
50. Various other bargaining demands related to health and safety have been designated as mandatory subjects of bargaining by PERB. A demand that all police patrol cars
be equipped with air conditioning has been held to be mandatory in several different cases,
on the grounds that the subject relates primarily to the health and comfort of the employees. Teamsters Local 294 (City of Amsterdam), 10 P.E.R.B. 1 3007 (1977); Police Ass'n of
City of New Rochelle, 10 P.E.R.B. T 3042 (1977); Scarsdale P.B.A., 8 P.E.R.B. 1 3075 (1975).
Similarly, under the rubric of "personal comfort, convenience and safety," PERB has held
mandatory a demand that police officers "in adjoining sectors or in the same radio motor
patrol car" be allowed to take meal breaks together, provided that the desk officer "reasonably" approve and adequate personnel remain on duty. P.B.A. of Nassau County, 14 P.E.R.B.
1 4557, at 4627 (1981). A demand that the employer be required to pay for annual physical
examinations for employees was held to be mandatory in Onondaga-Madison BOCES, 13
P.E.R.B. 1 3015 (1980), afl'd, 82 A.D.2d 691, 444 N.Y.S.2d 226 (3d Dep't 1981). A related
demand, that the employer be required to provide a physical fitness program for employees,
was held to be mandatory in Police Association of New Rochelle, 13 P.E.R.B. 1 3082 (1980).
In the same case, PERB also found to be mandatory a demand that the employer establish
a Medical Review Board, which would determine whether illnesses or injuries of unit employees were job-related. In Somers Faculty Association, 9 P.E.R.B. 1 3014 (1976), PERB
held mandatory a teachers' union proposal to establish procedures for safeguarding teachers
from disruptive or violent students. PERB has held to be mandatory a demand that no
employee be required to operate a vehicle which has been found to be unsafe. Scarsdale
P.B.A., 8 P.E.R.B. 3075 (1975); P.B.A. of White Plains, 12 P.E.R.B. 1 3046 (1979). However, in the two preceding cases, PERB refused to require bargaining over a demand that
any vehicle shown to have a mechanical or safety defect must be taken out of service.
PERB's reasoning was that the employer might decide that the vehicle, while unsafe for use
by a policeman on patrol, was usable in other functions. Consequently, the demand was too
far-ranging in its scope to constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining, because it would
unduly curtail the prerogative of management to decide how to use its equipment in providing services to the public. In City of Lackawanna, 15 P.E.R.B. 1 4522 (1982), PERB held
that the City violated its mandatory bargaining duty by unilaterally terminating free parking arrangements, where alternative parking arrangements offered by the City were objectionable on safety grounds.
51. With respect to the private sector, the NLRB has held that the selection of particular safety equipment to be used by employees is a mandatory subject for bargaining. J.P.
Stevens & Co., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 738 (1978), modified on other grounds, J.P. Stevens &
Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980).
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particular equipment which the union deems necessary for safety
reasons. And, as noted in the discussion of staffing, unions may be
able to compel arbitration over disputes with respect to the subjects of these demands if their contracts include general safety
clauses, by alleging violations of the safety clauses in particular
situations.
Examples of non-mandatory demands include the following:
bullet-proof vests and shotguns for policemen; 52 grill lights on po-

lice cars;53 provision of firearms for bridge and tunnel officers;" an-

nual handgun training for all officers;5 5 contractual specifications of
minimum number of vehicles to patrol on a shift;56 number of police to be assigned per patrol car;5 contractual requirement to fill
all vacancies within a specified period of time; 58 contractual adoption, by reference, of the National Fire Protection Association
Manual as a safety standard for performance of unit work; 59 proposal to relieve employees of responsibility for maintaining safety of
equipment and apparatus where the employee feels he is not able
to effect necessary repairs; 0 restrictions on requiring police officers
to handle dead bodies which have decomposed to the point of of52. Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, 13 P.E.R.B. 1 4540 (1980) (bullet-proof vests). PERB
considered this to be a demand with "safety implications," but one essentially relating to
the manner and means of rendering public service. 13 P.E.R.B. 4540, at 4582. Police Ass'n
of New Rochelle, 10 P.E.R.B. 3042 (1977) (shotguns for police vehicles). PERB held that
"selection of weapons and their tactical deployment" was a managerial prerogative. 10
P.E.R.B. 3042 at 3079, citing In re City of Albany, 7 P.E.R.B. 1 3078 (1974).
53. Police Ass'n of New Rochelle, 10 P.E.R.B. 1 3042 (1977) (grill lights). PERB considered this topic difficult, since it dealt with both safety and manner of providing service.
However, PERB decided that manner of service predominated.
54. Bridge and Tunnel Officers Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 12 P.E.R.B. 1 4614 (1979) (selection and deployment of weapons).
55. P.B.A. of Nassau County, 14 P.E.R.B. 4557 (1981). Training is held by PERB to
be a decision about "extent and quality of service." Id. at 4630.
56. White Plains P.B.A., 9 P.E.R.B. %3007 (1976).
57. Id.
58. Scarsdale P.B.A., 8 P.E.R.B. 1 3075 (1975). PERB held that this was really a demand aimed at restricting staff reductions, and that staff reductions are a managerial decision. Id. at 3133.
59. Rochester Firefighters Local 1071, 12 P.E.R.B. 3047 (1979). PERB objected to a
demand to incorporate by reference an external set of documents which was "voluminous"
and which covered "many matters that are not terms and conditions of employment." Id. at
3086-87.
60. Fairview Firefighters, 12 P.E.R.B. 3083 (1979). PERB held that public employers
have "exclusive discretion" to hold employees responsible for work assigned to them. Id. at
3157.
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fensiveness, except in genuine emergencies;"1 restrictions on scheduling police foot patrols late at night and restrictions on boating
operations late at night;62 and restrictions on scheduling fire inspections when temperature is too high, too low, or precipitation is
occurring.0 3
In each of these cases, the union advanced an argument that
the demand involved the health or safety of employees. While admitting in many instances that health and safety were affected by
the equipment or practice in question, PERB determined that a
contractual restriction of the type proposed would invade the management prerogatives of the public employer to determine what
equipment it will use, or how and when it will fulfill its mission of
providing service to the public.
As noted above, these holdings do not really preclude the unions from bargaining about these subjects. As "permissive" subjects, they can be bargained about if the public employer is willing
to discuss them. Furthermore, each of them can be restructured as
a mandatory bargaining issue in terms of "impact" or "hazardous
duty pay."" As such, it seems that their designation by PERB as
being non-mandatory does not exclude them totally from the scope
of collective bargaining.
III. IMPACT OF RECENT SAFETY AND HEALTH LEGISLATION

With the recent passage of occupational safety and health laws
and toxic substance laws to cover public sector employees in New
York,65 additional questions have arisen. To what extent can public sector unions require bargaining over the employer's statutory
duties with respect to health and safety? More particularly, can a
61. P.B.A. of Nassau County, 14 P.E.R.B. 1 4557 (1981). PERB held that this demand
would unlawfully restrict the employer's right "to assign a task inherently part of the police
officer's function." Id. at 4630.
62. Id.
63. Rochester Firefighters Local 1071, 12 P.E.R.B. 1 3047 (1979); Fairview Firefighters,
12 P.E.R.B. 1 3083 (1979). See also Greenville Uniformed Firemen's Ass'n, Local 2093, 15
P.E.R.B. 4501, at 4511 (1981). Scheduling work is regarded by PERB to be a management
prerogative.
64. In this regard, note the similarity of many of the subjects mentioned in this section
to the hazardous duty pay demands upheld by PERB in the Haverstraw P.B.A. case, discussed supra in text accompanying note 37.
65. N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW, §§ 4800-08 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82), (enacted June 30,
1980); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 875-883 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) (enacted June 26, 1980); N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 27-a (McKinney Supp. 1981-82) (enacted June 30, 1980).
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public sector union require an employer to bargain over a union
demand to create a situation which might result in a health or
safety hazard which is forbidden, either expressly or impliedly, by
statute?66
PERB has apparently not yet ruled on the above questions
with respect to health and safety issues. However, its rulings generally on the subject of statutory obligations as opposed to bargaining demands are instructive. In this regard, PERB has embraced
the following general formulation: "A demand relating to a subject
which is treated by statute is negotiable so long as the statute does

not clearly preempt the entire subject matter and the demand
does
8' 7

not diminish or merely restate the statutory benefits.
8 the
As illustrative of this principle, in City of Rochester,"
union demanded a provision which would make arbitrable the
City's refusal to pay bills for medical services performed for em-

ployees injured while on duty. The City argued that because the
New York General Municipal Law covered the same general sub-

ject matter,69 the statutory rights of employees and the public employer could not be made subject to contractual arbitration. PERB
disagreed, asserting that the statute did not preempt the entire
subject matter,7' 0 and that the proposal was in no way an attempt
66. This is not a frivolous question. In the private sector, a union demand that employees not be required to wear hardhats is a mandatory subject of bargaining, even though
pertinent federal OSHA regulations may require wearing of hardhats on the job in question.
See Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 534
F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores] (refusal of union
represented employees to wear hardhats in defiance of OSHA regulations subjects employer
to liability under OSHA, even though NLRB has held that employer must bargain with
union over hardhat requirement); accord, I.T.O. Corp. of New England v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d
543 (1st Cir. 1976). Furthermore, the NLRB has held that an employer's unilateral imposition of disciplinary rules with respect to violation of safety requirements by employees was
an unfair labor practice. Electri-Flex Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 713 (1978), enforced, 104 L.R.R.M.
2612 (7th Cir. 1979) (suspension imposed for repeated failure to wear safety glasses). In
Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, the Third Circuit also recognized that the employer could not
unilaterally impose disciplinary rules with respect to refusal to wear hardhats, when it noted
that such rules would be a subject for collective bargaining. 534 F.2d at 555.
67. City of Rochester, 12 P.E.R.B. 1 3010, at 3017 (1979).
68. Id.
69. Although no particular provision of that law was mentioned in PERB's opinion,
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw, § 92-a (McKinney 1977) appears to be the provision the City relied
upon in making the argument.
70. Indeed, the statutory provision in question merely authorizes municipalities to expend funds for the purpose of providing medical coverage for their employees, without specifying how disputes over payment of bills are to be settled.
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to diminish or restate statutory rights, but rather was an attempt
to introduce an additional mechanism for the enforcement of those
rights. PERB added that it was aware of no public policy against
leaving enforcement of statutory rights to a contractual arbitration
process. Consequently, the demand was a mandatory subject of
bargaining.
In the same case, the union also demanded a provision dealing
with standards for granting maternity leave. The proposed standards would be different from those governing other sorts of medical leaves. PERB held that this was not a mandatory subject of
bargaining, because the public policy of the state, as announced by
the court of appeals, was that pregnancy and childbirth were not
to be treated differently from other disabilities for purposes of
leave.7 1 Consequently, adoption of any proposal that would treat

pregnancy differently would violate the state's Human Rights
Law.7 2 The public employer, said PERB, could not be compelled to

negotiate about a proposal which, if implemented, would clearly
violate the law.73
*Presumably, if a public sector union were to demand a contractual provision which would clearly violate a specific safety
standard under the public sector occupational safety and health
laws of New York, the demand would constitute an illegal, and
thus neither mandatory nor permissive, subject of bargaining for
the reasons articulated by PERB in City of Rochester. That is, a
public employer should not be compelled to negotiate about a proposal which, if implemented, would clearly constitute a violation of
law, even though the proposal relates to a term or condition of
employment.74
A PERB decision which issued just months before the effective date of the New York State Occupational Safety & Health
71. Union Free School Dist. No. 6 v. Human Rights Appeals Bd., 35 N.Y.2d 371, 320
N.E.2d 859, 362 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1974).
72. N.Y. EXEc. LAw, Art. 15, which prohibits, inter alia, discrimination in terms and
conditions of employment on account of sex.
73. City of Rochester, 12 P.E.R.B. 1 3010.
74. That the NLRB has apparently rejected this approach in the safety area, as exemplified by the hardhat problem in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, does not necessarily mean
that PERB must follow suit. Indeed, there is a certain horrible fascination to the idea that
one public agency (PERB) may be placed in the position of requiring another public agency
(the public employer) to negotiate over a demand that it violate a law administered by yet
another public agency (the N.Y. State Department of Labor).
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Law (SOSHA) may point to an area where this principle will be
tested. In Steuben-Allegheny BOCES,7 5 PERB ruled that an employer's unilateral decision to restrict smoking to certain areas of
its building was a mandatory subject of bargaining. No health argument was explicitly made in that case, to judge by the official
report; rather, certain non-smokers who were not unit employees
had requested the employer to. designate a non-smoking area so
that they would not have to work in the midst of tobacco fumes
and smoke emitted by members of the bargaining unit. The employer unilaterally announced that henceforth all smoking would
be restricted to the kitchen and the conference room, which were
the rooms considered by the employer to have the best ventilation
in the building. Employees were restricted to smoking when they
could take breaks from their work and go to one of those rooms.
Thus, the issue was framed in terms of accommodating the preferences of certain employees for a smoke-free environment. PERB
held that management's interest in controlling the working environment and satisfying the interests of non-unit employees did not
clearly outweigh the interests of unit employees in their working
conditions. Consequently, the employer was ordered by PERB to
rescind its smoking policy and negotiate with the union if it
76
wanted to institute such a policy in the future.
With the enactment of SOSHA there is now a statutory policy
requiring public employers to provide safe and healthy workplaces." Thus, there will be new arguments for PERB to factor
into the equation. In line with the general policy on statutory issues quoted above, PERB may well hold that the question of
smoking rules has become a non-mandatory subject, because any
demand to allow smoking could result in a diminishing of the statutory rights of all employees (regardless of their bargaining unit
status) to a healthy workplace, and thus cause a violation of the
75. 13 P.E.R.B. 1 3096 (1980).
76. Id. at 3153. Compare Smith v. Western Electric Co., 51 U.S.L.W. 2200 (Mo. Ct.
App., E.D. 9/14/82) (employer must provide smoke-free environment if required by nonsmoking employee).
77. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a(3)(a)(1) (McKinney 1981-82):
Every employer shall furnish to each of its employees, employment and a place
of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are
likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will
provide reasonable and adequate protection to lives, safety or health of its
employees.
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public employer's statutory duty.78
PERB will also have to deal with the question whether
SOSHA and the Toxic Substances Law have "preempted the field"
to exclude bargaining over occupational safety and health issues in
whole or in part.7 9 The new state laws do not expressly speak to
the issue of preemption, but various provisions, such as those giving the Industrial Commissioner exclusive authority to enforce
safety standards,80 might be read to have preemptive force with
respect to questions of compliance with state safety standards. On
the other hand, the new laws incorporate many references to "employee representatives," perhaps signalling an expectation by the
legislators that labor organizations will have a significant role to
play under these laws in representing the safety and health interests of employees."'
78. In Johns-Manville Sales v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 621 F.2d 756 (5th Cir.
1980), a private sector case, the employer unilaterally promulgated a no-smoking rule (with
a discharge penalty for repeat offenders) in an asbestos products plant, citing as justification
that only smokers were at special health risk in the plant. The employer argued that its
general duty under OSHA to provide a safe working place compelled the new work rule. The
union grieved promulgation of the rule and won the ensuing arbitration case. The federal
court refused to vacate the arbitrator's award, holding that OSHA could, if it wished, forbid
smoking in the plant, but that the employer, bound by his collective agreement, had to
abide by the arbitrator's award in the absence of any specific OSHA regulation against
smoking in asbestos plants. Thus, the "general duty" policy under safety and health laws
would, in the federal court's opinion, not relieve an employer from its duty to bargain over
new safety rules, unless a specific OSHA regulation compelled adoption of a particular rule.
(Note the contrast with the court holding in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, supra note 66,
where even a specific OSHA regulation requiring wearing of hardhats was held not to relieve
the employer from its duty to bargain with the union over the right to discipline employees
for refusing to wear hardhats.)
79. The NLRB has never accepted the argument that statutory safety requirements
relieve an employer from a duty to bargain over safety issues. In Gulf Power Co. the Board
commented:
Such laws, like the minimum wage and a variety of governmental regulations,
merely establish certain minimum requirements in their respective fields as conditions of doing business and are not intended to preempt their fields of regulation to such an extent as to exclude therefrom the concept of collective
bargaining.
150 N.L.R.B. 622, 626 (1967). In J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 738 (1978), the
NLRB held that an employer was not free unilaterally to select safety equipment required
to comply with a citation from OSHA; the employer was required to bargain with the union
over such a selection, because the introduction of new equipment would change employment
conditions of unit employees.
80. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 27-a(2) and (6) (McKinney 1981-82).
81. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Law, §§ 876, 879, 880; SOSHA, §§ 27-a(i)(c), 27-a(6),
27-a(6)(c), 27-a(7)(c), 27-a(9)(c), 27-a(10). In essence, the "employee representative" is given
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It seems most likely that PERB will occupy a middle ground
on the question of preemption, similar to that expressed by the
NLRB and the federal courts in the private sector. The public sec-

tor unions could reasonably argue that particular SOSHA standards should be seen as minimum standards. So long as the
union's demand is not for a less safe standard, it would not be inconsistent with the scope and purpose of the safety laws to require
bargaining over demands for more stringent safety requirements. 2
Similarly, a demand for creation of a joint safety committee to
take up safety issues does not appear inconsistent with the statu-

tory enforcement authority of the Industrial Commissioner.8 3
Consequently, PERB will be required to engage in a very subtle and difficult line-drawing exercise in accommodating the various statutory imperatives involved. Because the range of
mandatory subjects available to public sector unions is at least the-

oretically narrower than that available to their private sector counterparts, due to the restriction against bargaining over the "man-

ner and means" of providing public services, the unions can be
expected strenuously to resist conceding any negotiation rights in
the health and safety area. However, public employers who are
faced for the first time with compliance demands under voluminous health and safety regulations8" are likely to be eager to avoid
access to records and information, the right to participate in initiating and carrying out
inspections, and various procedural rights with respect to SOSHA proceedings. Employee
representatives are also authorized to sue for injunctive relief with respect to safety violations under certain circumstances. It is noteworthy fil this regard that public sector unions
were active proponents of the new health and safety laws when they were pending in the
state legislature.
82. Under this theory, PERB would certainly have to reassess its rationale in SteubenAlleghany BOCES, 13 P.E.R.B. 3096 (1981) (unilateral promulgation of smoking rules), if
a similar case were to arise and a health argument were raised.
83. However, it would probably be unlawful for the employer to demand that the joint
safety committee procedure preclude employees or the union from directly pursuing their
rights under the state's Toxic Substances Law § 880. Section 880 provides a mechanism for
employees or their representatives to obtain information regarding toxic substances used in
the workplace, and also for the filing of charges against employers with the Industrial Commissioner. An employer request that employees waive these rights constitutes "an act of
discrimination" under the statute. Id. at § 880(7).
84. Section 27-a(4)(a) directs the Industrial Commissioner to adopt by rule-making and
apply to all public employees in the state "all safety and health standards promulgated
under the United States Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970 (Public Law, 91-596)
which are in effect on the effective date of this section .... " While the Commissioner's first
attempt to comply with this section has been held defective due to failure to comply with
state constitutional rule-making requirements, New York State Coalition of Public Employ-
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the complications of negotiating about the extent of their statutory
health and safety duties. Consequently, it is likely that the scope
of negotiations on safety and health issues will continue to be
sharply contested by the parties.
CONCLUSION

The issues of safety and health bring into sharp focus the basic dilemma of public sector collective bargaining, involving as they
do public policies which are frequently at apparent cross-purposes.
On the one hand, there is the strong policy that decisions about
the manner and method of providing public services be made by
officials accountable to the public. On the other, there is the more
recent but equally strongly expressed policy of allowing public employees to engage in collective negotiations over their terms and
conditions of employment, which certainly include many issues of
safety and health. The reconciliation of these policy conflicts by
PERB is now complicated further by the imposition of new statutory health and safety duties upon public sector employers, under
which a large body of private sector regulatory material developed
piecemeal over many years by federal agencies will be applied en
masse to the public sector.
Under these circumstances, it is essential that PERB develop
a policy with respect to safety and health issues that takes into
account the responsibilities of public employers under SOSHA. In
this regard, PERB should avoid creating the sort of situation illustrated by the Atlantic Stevedores case, i.e., obligating employers to
bargain with unions about demands by the unions to violate safety
regulations. Union demands that would require a public employer
to negotiate about the decrease of compliance (or lack of compliance) with safety and health regulations should be treated as illegal subjects which unions may not raise at the bargaining table.
Inasmuch as the unions have rights under SOSHA to invoke the
State Department of Labor processes if an employer fails to comply with SOSHA standards and regulations, there is no need to
subject demands over compliance with SOSHA requirements to
ers v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 110 Misc. 2d 215, 441 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup. Ct., Albany
County 1981), upon proper promulgation, the public employers of New York will be subject
to the requirements of about 950 pages of substantive safety and health standards found in
29 C.F.R. §§ 1910 and 1926.

1982]

PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING

the bargaining process.
To the extent that a union is demanding a safer workplace
than would be required by SOSHA regulations, different considerations come into play. The NLRB policy enunciated in Gulf Power
Co.85 appears eminently reasonable in this regard, to the extent
that it can be accommodated with the conflicting public policy
questions implicated in the basic health and safety dilemma. Consequently, viewing the matter abstractly, it follows that a demand
for more stringent safety practices should be considered a
mandatory subject for bargaining.
Finally, however, there remains the most fundamental question: where should PERB draw the line with respect to the basic
dilemma? As noted above, the "line," to the extent it exists, appears to waver, being in some areas indecisive, and in others of
almost no effect. For example, PERB must recognize "hazardous
duty pay" for what it is-an indirect way for public sector unions
to demand bargaining over issues which PERB has ruled to be
non-mandatory as a matter of public policy. As such, the subterfuge of hazardous duty pay should not be allowed to continue, because it undermines the integrity of the very policy PERB purports to be applying when it labels a particular safety demand nonmandatory. At the same time, PERB should take a serious look at
the subjects it has declared non-mandatory and consider, realistically, whether important issues of policy determination by responsible public officials are really implicated in demands such as providing bullet-proof vests or grill lights on police cars. While there
are certainly some demands couched in safety terms (such as arming bridge and tunnel officers) 86 that carry broad public policy implications and probably should not be subject to mandatory bargaining, the list of such subjects may well be smaller than PERB
has thus far indicated.
PERB should also devote some attention to the scope of safety
committee jurisdiction. A joint safety committee is of course
merely a mechanism for bargaining over safety issues during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, if a particular safety proposal is not a mandatory subject of bargaining at
contract negotiation time, it should logically not be considered a
85.

156 N.L.R.B. 622, enforced, 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967).

86. Bridge & Tunnel Officers Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 12 P.E.R.B. 1 4614 (1979).
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proper subject for consideration by a joint safety committee, and
certainly not a subject for mandatory grievance arbitration. PERB
should not follow the easier path by telling the parties that important safety questions can be dealt with on a case-by-case basis
through a joint committee mechanism, but need not be dealt with
as part of contract negotiations. This is merely deferring the question, not settling it.
As to the basic determination of whether a particular proposal
is mandatory, PERB should be giving careful study to the question
whether important issues of policy with respect to public services
are truly implicated in a particular demand. To a certain extent,
every demand which increases the cost of public services or affects
how they are performed can be said to involve the making of public policy. However, if public sector labor relations is to be a meaningful process, this public policy argument should not be used to
"bootstrap" on issues where the demand clearly relates to a basic
term or condition of employment. In this regard, the public policy
requiring bargaining on "terms and conditions of employment" is
clear, unequivocal and express. 8 7 Indeed, the New York Court of

Appeals, in defining the scope of mandatory issues, has emphasized
that all terms and conditions of employment are negotiable unless
the object of the demand "is a basic element of... policy bearing
on the extent and quality of the service rendered."88 Under this
formulation, PERB should not hold a particular demand to be
non-mandatory unless its object is clearly basic or fundamental to
a determination of quality of service rendered to the public. Under
such a test, few subjects should be ruled out, because many demands, while having greater or lesser bearing on such policy considerations, can hardly be considered fundamental or basic.
In the end, PERB must still deal with safety questions on a
case-by-case basis. However, by taking care to articulate the theory
behind its decisions and to eschew the inconsistencies of the past,
PERB may avoid complicating the task of public employers faced
with new statutory duties in the field of employee safety and
health.

87. N.Y. Civ. SEnRv. LAw § 214(1) (McKinney 1973).
88. West Irondequoit Teachers Ass'n v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d at 51, 315 N.E.2d at 777, 358
N.Y.S.2d at 723.

